The Huge Cost of an Undersized House of Representatives

Reduce federal spending by turning our House of Representatives into a virtual plebiscite

Substantially enlarging our representation would save billions of dollars.

The most commonly stated objection to enlarging our House of Representatives is that it would be too expensive. However, though it seems counterintuitive, substantially enlarging the House is actually expected to save billions of dollars.

What do we mean by substantially enlarging the House? Based on the 2020 population census, we should have over 6,000 Representatives (rather than 435) in order for the House to be in compliance with the Constitution’s one-person-one-vote equality requirement. For the purposes of this analysis, we are evaluating a 6,692-member House as our hypothetical, which would also bring the House into compliance with the formulation proposed by the intended version of Article the first.

So what is the cost of a 6,692-member House? A recent analysis by Gemini Pro estimated that the additional cost would be $1.9 billion annually, in 2025 dollars. (This cost analysis utilized Thirty-Thousand.org’s implementation recommendations, such as having a vast majority of the Representatives working from their home districts, and adjusting their compensation for regional cost of living differences.) Grok’s analysis was a little more conservative, estimating the additional cost to be between $1.9 to $2.4 billion annually, which would be 0.028% to 0.035% of the 2024 federal budget.

How would that impact overall federal spending? For the reasons explained below, we have long argued that a substantially larger House would reduce federal spending. Those arguments are bolstered by the published research of Mark Thornton & Marc Ulrich.¹See Constituency Size and Government Spending and Constituency Size and the Growth of Public Expenditures: The Case of the United Kingdom

Grok 3 was recently asked to evaluate all the information cited above, along with any other credible resources that it could access, in order to determine the impact that a 6,692-member House would have on federal spending. Its analysis, titled “Fiscal Impact of Expanding the U.S. House of Representatives to 6,692 Members”, concluded that a larger House of Representatives would not only be more democratic, but also more fiscally responsible. Grok estimated that the annual reduction in federal spending (resulting from a 6,692 member House) would likely be $85 to $100 billion (less the additional expense of the enlarged House). Based on that, it estimated there is a 90%+ probability that the federal savings would exceed the additional cost of the larger House.

To get a different AI perspective, Gemini Pro was asked to evaluate all the same information, as well as anything else it could access. In its analysis, “An Evaluation of the Projected Fiscal Impact of Expanding the U.S. House of Representatives”, it stated that the “assertion that expanding the House of Representatives to 6,692 members has a 90-95% probability of resulting in a net fiscal benefit is a credible and well-founded conclusion. It is based on sound academic theory that links constituency size to fiscal restraint, and it is supported by a fiscal model that contrasts a small, fixed cost against a vast potential for savings”.

The Financial Argument: Why a Larger House Would Cost Less

Here are the key reasons why a substantially larger House is projected to curb federal spending.

1. Enhanced Accountability and Voter Monitoring

The most significant change from a larger House would be the drastic reduction in the average number of constituents per Representative. With 6,692 Representatives, each would serve a district of approximately 50,000 people, a stark contrast to the current average of over 760,000.

These significantly smaller districts would foster a much stronger bond between the Representatives and their constituents, especially with a vast majority of the Representatives working from their home districts. In such a small districts, constituents can more easily monitor their representative’s voting record, question their decisions at town halls, and hold them directly accountable for their actions in Washington. This heightened scrutiny makes it politically hazardous for a politician to support wasteful “pork-barrel” projects or vote for massive, unread omnibus spending bills. The Representative’s career becomes more closely tied to the tangible approval of their neighbors, not distant donors, creating a strong incentive for fiscal prudence.

2. Reduced Influence of Special Interests and Big Money

Running a competitive campaign in a district of three-quarters of a million people is an expensive endeavor, often requiring millions of dollars for television ads, mailers, and professional staff. This financial reality forces candidates to spend a significant portion of their time fundraising, making them heavily reliant on large contributions from corporations, unions, and wealthy individuals. These Special Interests often lobby for specific subsidies, tax loopholes, and regulations that benefit them financially, contributing to inefficient and bloated federal spending.

In a district of 50,000, the entire campaign model is upended. Grassroots organizing, door-knocking, and local events become more effective and far less costly than mass media advertising. With campaign costs plummeting to a fraction of their current level, candidates would no longer be dependent on special interest money to win elections. This financial independence would free representatives to vote in the best interests of their constituents, allowing them to cut the very subsidies and wasteful programs that special interests currently protect.

3. Curbing “Pork-Barrel” Spending

“Pork-barrel” projects, also known as earmarks, are provisions inserted into a bill that direct federal funds to specific projects or organizations, often in a representative’s home district. While these projects can sometimes be beneficial, they are often criticized as a form of political patronage, used to reward supporters and curry favor with voters.

In smaller, more competitive districts, representatives would be under greater scrutiny from their constituents. This would make it more difficult to justify wasteful or unnecessary pork-barrel projects, leading to a reduction in this type of spending. Even when such a project might benefit a few small congressional districts, their Representatives would be greatly outnumbered by the thousands of others who are not similarly benefited.

The defense budget is another area where the report sees potential for significant savings. The argument here is similar to the one about special interests. Large defense contractors are major political donors, and their influence can lead to the funding of unnecessary or overpriced weapons systems.

By making representatives more accountable to their constituents, who ultimately bear the burden of this spending, a larger House would be more likely to scrutinize the defense budget and cut wasteful spending.

4. Weakening the Power of “Logrolling”

“Logrolling” is the legislative practice of trading votes, where Representative A agrees to vote for Representative B’s pet project in exchange for a vote on their own. This dynamic is a primary driver of large, inefficient spending bills, as provisions are added to secure enough votes for passage.

A much larger House would make this kind of vote-trading exponentially more difficult. Forging a majority coalition of thousands of representatives would be a monumental task, and the smaller, more ideologically homogeneous districts would give each member less political cover to vote for spending that doesn’t directly benefit their community. The result would be a legislative environment where broad consensus is required, making it harder to pass the kind of massive spending packages that have become commonplace.

5. Academic and Economic Evidence

The argument for a larger House is not merely theoretical; it is supported by empirical studies by Thornton & Ulrich (cited above). Their arguments, based on public choice economics, shows a clear pattern: As constituencies grow larger and more diverse, per capita government spending tends to increase. This is because representatives in large districts must cater to a wider array of competing interests, often by supporting broader and more expensive government programs.

By reversing this trend and creating smaller, more cohesive districts, the structural pressure driving spending is alleviated. The experience of state legislatures and international bodies supports this finding, suggesting that the size of a legislature is a critical, and often overlooked, factor in determining the size of its government.

Conclusion

The case for reducing federal spending by expanding the House of Representatives is built on a foundation of improved accountability, diminished special interest influence, and structural changes to the legislative process. By bringing representatives closer to the people they serve, the incentives shift from catering to powerful donors to practicing sound fiscal management.

When contemplating this subject, It helps to understand that the Executive Branch is the government, whereas the Legislative Branch is governance, like a board of directors. By greatly enlarging our governance, and thereby shrinking the congressional districts, the very nature of political accountability and legislative dynamics would change, leading to a Congress that is both more representative and more frugal.

Consider also that the House has been frozen at 435 Representatives since 1913 even though the nation’s population has since more than tripled! Around that time federal spending was below 3% of GDP, and has since climbed to over 23% by 2024. Of course, there are several causal factors for the increase in federal spending, but the role of a decreasingly representative House should not be ignored.

The estimates that Grok and Gemini provided are certainly subject to debate, and could be improved upon by a deeper scholarly analysis. In the meantime, they provide credible approximations to help inform a national discussion regarding the need to enlarge our House of Representatives. We believe that any credible analysis would show that a substantially larger House would effectively pay for itself, if not bring about a net reduction in federal spending. Given that, the question isn’t whether it’s too expensive to significantly enlarge the House, but whether we can afford not to.

© Thirty-Thousand.org [published 8/17/25]