Gemini Report: The Potential Impact of Smaller Congressional Districts on Federal Spending
Posted: Tue Aug 12, 2025 10:15 am
This is a report created by Google’s Gemini Pro on August 12, 2025.
Gemini created and titled this report in response to our request to examine the arguments made by Thirty-Thousand.org that federal spending would decline as the size of the House of Representatives is increased (i.e., as the average constituency size per Representatives is decreased). These arguments are elaborated upon in this article: Restore Liberty and Federal Fiscal Responsibility, and further substantiated in the following two academic papers:
Constituency Size and Government Spending ; and,
Constituency Size and the Growth of Public Expenditures: The Case of the United Kingdom
This Gemini report concludes that “Disregarding the operational costs of a larger legislature, the evidence strongly suggests that increasing the size of the House of Representatives to substantially reduce constituency size would be a powerful long-term check on federal spending”. Gemini's report is reproduced below, in its entirety, unedited.
In a separate report, Gemini has estimated the additional operational cost of enlarging the House of Representatives to 6,692 members.
Gemini’s report is repeated below verbatim.
Report: The Potential Impact of Smaller Congressional Districts on Federal Spending
This report evaluates the likely effects on U.S. federal spending of a significant enlargement of the House of Representatives, which would consequently decrease the population size of each congressional district. The analysis is based on the economic and political science principles detailed in the research of Mark Thornton and the arguments concerning representative accountability.
1. Reversing the Core Driver of Spending: Restoring Accountability
The central thesis of the research is that larger constituencies are a primary driver of higher government spending. The current system, with districts approaching 800,000 people, creates a severe accountability gap between citizens and their representatives. A drastic reduction in district size—for example, to 50,000 or 100,000 people—would directly counter this by:
Beyond the individual representative's incentives, changing the constituency size would alter the dynamics within the House of Representatives itself.
Conclusion
Disregarding the operational costs of a larger legislature, the evidence strongly suggests that increasing the size of the House of Representatives to substantially reduce constituency size would be a powerful long-term check on federal spending.
This policy would not be a panacea, but it addresses the fundamental incentive structures that enable government growth. By strengthening the link between the citizen and the representative, it would make the act of spending public money more transparent and more politically costly. Representatives would be forced to operate in an environment where fiscal conservatism is more directly and immediately rewarded, leading to a legislature that is, as a whole, more cautious with the public purse. The mechanism is simple: when representatives are closer to the people who pay the taxes, they are more careful about how that money is spent.
As a follow up question, Gemini was asked: “Is there enough data available to estimate the impact on federal spending if the US House of Representatives were expanded to 6,692 Representatives? That would result in 6,692 congressional districts with each containing nearly 50,000 residents. (Again, disregard the additional cost of the expanded House of Representatives.)”
Gemini's full response is reproduced below verbatim.
No, there is not enough data to create a precise, reliable quantitative estimate of the exact impact on federal spending. However, there is substantial theoretical and empirical evidence to make a strong qualitative estimate that the impact would be significant downward pressure on spending.
The core challenge is that a change of this magnitude—from 435 to 6,692 representatives—is so far outside historical precedent that any statistical model would be making a risky extrapolation. However, based on existing data and established theory, we can confidently predict the direction of the effect, even if we cannot predict its exact size.
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯
The Challenge of a Precise Quantitative Estimate
Creating a specific forecast, such as "federal spending would decrease by X%," is not feasible for several key reasons:
The Strength of the Qualitative Estimate
Despite the quantitative uncertainty, we can make a very strong qualitative assessment based on consistent evidence. The available data strongly indicates that shrinking district size would create powerful downward pressure on spending.
Conclusion: Direction Over Magnitude
In summary, while we lack the data to calculate the exact magnitude of the spending impact, we have overwhelming theoretical and empirical evidence to be confident in its direction.
Think of it like a medical prognosis. A doctor can tell a patient with certainty that quitting a three-pack-a-day smoking habit will improve their health, even if they can't predict the exact date their cough will disappear or by precisely how much their lung capacity will increase.
Similarly, all available information suggests that expanding the House to 6,692 members would fundamentally rewire the incentives of the federal government toward greater fiscal discipline. While the exact dollar amount is unknowable, the direction of the change—downward pressure on spending—is clear.
Gemini created and titled this report in response to our request to examine the arguments made by Thirty-Thousand.org that federal spending would decline as the size of the House of Representatives is increased (i.e., as the average constituency size per Representatives is decreased). These arguments are elaborated upon in this article: Restore Liberty and Federal Fiscal Responsibility, and further substantiated in the following two academic papers:
Constituency Size and Government Spending ; and,
Constituency Size and the Growth of Public Expenditures: The Case of the United Kingdom
This Gemini report concludes that “Disregarding the operational costs of a larger legislature, the evidence strongly suggests that increasing the size of the House of Representatives to substantially reduce constituency size would be a powerful long-term check on federal spending”. Gemini's report is reproduced below, in its entirety, unedited.
In a separate report, Gemini has estimated the additional operational cost of enlarging the House of Representatives to 6,692 members.
Gemini’s report is repeated below verbatim.
Report: The Potential Impact of Smaller Congressional Districts on Federal Spending
This report evaluates the likely effects on U.S. federal spending of a significant enlargement of the House of Representatives, which would consequently decrease the population size of each congressional district. The analysis is based on the economic and political science principles detailed in the research of Mark Thornton and the arguments concerning representative accountability.
1. Reversing the Core Driver of Spending: Restoring Accountability
The central thesis of the research is that larger constituencies are a primary driver of higher government spending. The current system, with districts approaching 800,000 people, creates a severe accountability gap between citizens and their representatives. A drastic reduction in district size—for example, to 50,000 or 100,000 people—would directly counter this by:
- Weakening Special Interests: The most powerful argument is that smaller districts dilute the influence of large, moneyed special interests. In a small district, a representative's electoral success depends less on expensive mass media campaigns (funded by PACs and large donors) and more on direct, personal connections with voters. When a representative is a known community figure, it becomes politically riskier to vote for spending projects that benefit a distant special interest at the expense of local taxpayers. The concentrated benefits that lobbyists "sell" become less attractive when the diffused costs are being borne by your neighbors who you see at the grocery store.
- Enhancing Voter Monitoring: In a smaller district, citizens can monitor their representative more effectively. The "rational ignorance" that pervades large districts diminishes; when your vote feels more significant and your representative is more accessible, the incentive to stay informed increases. This heightened awareness creates a political climate where fiscal prudence is more likely to be rewarded, and wasteful spending is more likely to be punished at the ballot box.
- Increasing Representative Responsiveness: With a smaller and more socially cohesive constituency, a representative is more likely to share the economic realities and priorities of their constituents. They are less likely to be part of a distant political class and more likely to view the federal budget from the perspective of a local taxpayer. This shared perspective is a powerful, though informal, check on spending.
Beyond the individual representative's incentives, changing the constituency size would alter the dynamics within the House of Representatives itself.
- Logrolling and Vote-Trading: The practice of logrolling, where representatives trade votes ("I'll vote for your dam if you vote for my subsidy"), thrives on the anonymity of large districts. A representative can justify a vote for a wasteful project hundreds of miles away because its cost to their own district is minimal, and most constituents are unaware of the vote. In a system of smaller districts, where representatives are more accountable for every tax dollar, the political cost of such vote-trading rises. Representatives would face greater pressure to justify how each vote serves the direct interests of their local constituents, making it harder to support extraneous spending.
- Homogeneity of Interests: Smaller districts tend to be more homogeneous in their economic interests. This makes it more difficult for a representative to play one faction off another. They receive a clearer, more unified signal from their constituents, which often prioritizes broad-based fiscal health over targeted, narrow spending programs.
Conclusion
Disregarding the operational costs of a larger legislature, the evidence strongly suggests that increasing the size of the House of Representatives to substantially reduce constituency size would be a powerful long-term check on federal spending.
This policy would not be a panacea, but it addresses the fundamental incentive structures that enable government growth. By strengthening the link between the citizen and the representative, it would make the act of spending public money more transparent and more politically costly. Representatives would be forced to operate in an environment where fiscal conservatism is more directly and immediately rewarded, leading to a legislature that is, as a whole, more cautious with the public purse. The mechanism is simple: when representatives are closer to the people who pay the taxes, they are more careful about how that money is spent.
As a follow up question, Gemini was asked: “Is there enough data available to estimate the impact on federal spending if the US House of Representatives were expanded to 6,692 Representatives? That would result in 6,692 congressional districts with each containing nearly 50,000 residents. (Again, disregard the additional cost of the expanded House of Representatives.)”
Gemini's full response is reproduced below verbatim.
No, there is not enough data to create a precise, reliable quantitative estimate of the exact impact on federal spending. However, there is substantial theoretical and empirical evidence to make a strong qualitative estimate that the impact would be significant downward pressure on spending.
The core challenge is that a change of this magnitude—from 435 to 6,692 representatives—is so far outside historical precedent that any statistical model would be making a risky extrapolation. However, based on existing data and established theory, we can confidently predict the direction of the effect, even if we cannot predict its exact size.
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯
The Challenge of a Precise Quantitative Estimate
Creating a specific forecast, such as "federal spending would decrease by X%," is not feasible for several key reasons:
- Lack of Federal Precedent: The U.S. has operated with a House of 435 members for over a century, while the population has tripled.1 There is no historical data point for the federal government that even remotely resembles a 6,692-member House with districts of 50,000 people. A statistical model built on the last 100 years of data would not be able to accurately predict the effects of such a radical structural change.
- State-Level Data is Imperfect: While some states have very small legislative districts, this data cannot be perfectly mapped onto the federal system. States have different responsibilities (e.g., no national defense spending) and often face constitutional constraints (like balanced budget amendments) that the federal government does not. While this data is excellent for supporting the theory, it's not suitable for building a precise predictive model of federal behavior.
- Confounding Variables: Over the decades, countless factors beyond constituency size have driven federal spending: major wars, economic recessions, demographic shifts, technological change, and evolving social priorities. Isolating the precise mathematical contribution of the single variable of constituency size from this complex web of influences is nearly impossible.
The Strength of the Qualitative Estimate
Despite the quantitative uncertainty, we can make a very strong qualitative assessment based on consistent evidence. The available data strongly indicates that shrinking district size would create powerful downward pressure on spending.
- Consistent Theoretical Framework: The entire body of research we've discussed points in one direction. Smaller districts strengthen the bond of accountability, reduce the influence of money in politics, and force representatives to be more responsive to the taxpayers who elect them. These are the very mechanisms that restrain government spending.
- The New Hampshire Example: The state of New Hampshire offers a real-world case study. Its House of Representatives has 400 members, with each representing a tiny district of only about 3,500 people. Representatives are often volunteers who earn just $100 per year. As a direct result of this highly localized and accountable structure, New Hampshire consistently ranks as one of the most fiscally conservative states with one of the lowest overall tax burdens in the nation. This provides powerful evidence that the model of small districts fosters fiscal restraint.
Conclusion: Direction Over Magnitude
In summary, while we lack the data to calculate the exact magnitude of the spending impact, we have overwhelming theoretical and empirical evidence to be confident in its direction.
Think of it like a medical prognosis. A doctor can tell a patient with certainty that quitting a three-pack-a-day smoking habit will improve their health, even if they can't predict the exact date their cough will disappear or by precisely how much their lung capacity will increase.
Similarly, all available information suggests that expanding the House to 6,692 members would fundamentally rewire the incentives of the federal government toward greater fiscal discipline. While the exact dollar amount is unknowable, the direction of the change—downward pressure on spending—is clear.